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1.  Introduction 
 
The European (un)employment problem has inspired millions of printed pages.  The 
consensus view emerged since the Eighties (and still popular today) is that 
employment growth in Europe can be achieved only to the extent that labour market 
flexibility will increase in parallel.  Since the Nineties a vast share of new hirings has 
taken the form of fixed time or temporary contracts, part-time positions, disguised 
forms of self-employment, work leasing, atypical contracts of various sorts.  An 
increasingly important issue is, therefore, whether it is possible to have flexibility and 
sound employment growth,  without bearing the high social and economic  costs 
associated to labor market flexibility.   
 
This study is a preliminary exploration on the extent of labor market segmentation in 
Europe and the United States, based on data of earnings mobility prepared for the 
OECD in the late Nineties.  This is an important issue for a balanced view on the 
pros-and-cons of labor market flexibility. 
 
The punch-line of this paper is that the USA and continental Europe differ in two 
respects: (i) upward and downward earning mobility of the relatively better off-
fraction of the work-force is higher in the USA than in the European countries;  
(ii) labor markets segmentation in the low tail of the earning distribution is  higher in 
the USA than in continental Europe. The Scandinavian countries are even more 
distant from the USA….  
 
The paper is organized as follows: par. 2 defines labor market segmentation (LMS). 
The methodology of this approach is illustrated, and the main results presented.   Par. 
3  discusses two alternative indicators of LMS  and provides a rationale for the U-
shaped relation which is found between LMS and indicators of employment 
performance. Par. 4  concludes with an overview of open issues. 
                                                 
1 This is a revised version of a study that dates back to 1998.  Most of the revisions have been written 
while visiting  the Institute for Industrial and Labor Relations, Princeton University in the spring of 
2000, where I was given very generous hospitality.   I have benefited from comments received  after 
presentations of this version at Princeton and the IMF, Washington, D.C. , and of the previous version 
at Torino, Padova and Aarhus.  In particular, I  wish to thank  O. Ashenfelter, T. Atkinson, G. Bertola, 
U. Colombino, H. Farber, R. Freeman, M. Guell, W. Salverda, and U. Trivellato.   This research has 
been carried out also thanks to a grant by  MURST (1999).         
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2. Earnings mobility and labor market segmentation 
Earnings inequality is reported to have risen in several OECD countries in the last 
twenty years.
2  Increasing pay inequality naturally leads on to the question of 
earnings mobility, for it matters whether particular individuals or groups are trapped 
in low-paid segments of the labour market or whether low pay is a transient 
phenomenon.
3    Increasing inequality may lead into low-pay persistence unless the 
possibility of enhancing one's human capital is guaranteed for all workers, either via 
public investment in education and training, or via private channels with finance 
made available to the more endowed as well as to the less endowed workers. 
 
The idea of labor market segmentation was introduced by M. Piore and P. Doeringer  
(   ) in the early 70’s;  it was successfully used by various Cambridge-Italian 
economists (…) to describe the working of Italy’s labour market, where,  parallel to 
the official economy,  there were thriving black/grey/unobserved manufacturing 
activities based on work-at-home and cottage industry-type establishments.  J. 
McDonald and  R. Solow (  ) modelled the wage setting in a dual economy with a 
primary unionised sector and a fully competitive secondary sector.  B. Contini and M. 
Galeotti  (1986) suggested a dynamic model of inflation and LMS in the vein of W. 
Baumol’s well known  Scandinavian two-sector model (   ). W. Dickens and Lang (  ) 
provided an empirical framework for testing the main hypotheses of LMS,  followed  
by  A. Brandolini, P. Cipollone and P. Sestito  (   ) who  applied it to the Italian 
economy. 







2 Among others:  P. Gottschalk and T.M. Smeeding, "Cross-national comparisons of earnings and 
income inequality", Journal of Economic Literature, vol.XXXV, 1997.  
3 Here we deal with intra-generational earnings mobility. Sociologists are usually more interested in social 
mobility, i.e. inter-generational mobility, an argument that would deserve a lot more of attention also by 
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The leading ideas of LMS were at the bases of all the contributions of the LOWER 
network on low-pay in Europe since the mid Nineties  (     and      ).  The low-paying 
industries, employing  work-force with many of the characteristics attributed to the 
secondary segments by the LMS literature, are found to be quasi universal: 
agriculture, retail trade, hotels and catering,  personal services.   Low wages relate 
more to industry than personal characteristics, while the opposite applies to high 
wages. 
 
Here I define labor market segmentation (LMS) in terms of earnings mobility, i.e. as 
a dynamic situation in which coexist a large share of workers stuck for long periods 
in low pay (bad jobs or no job at all), and,  at the same time, a vast segment of 
working population that is very mobile, upwards or downwards, within one's own 
working life or across generations.  Mobility between the two segments is limited.   
Thus, persistence in low pay is necessary, but not sufficient for labor market 
segmentation, as defined here.  Other forms of LM-segmentation in terms of earnings 
mobility are quite conceivable, for instance, one in which immobility prevails 
everywhere in the earnings distribution: the poor stay forever poor, the rich forever 
rich, no matter what they do.  Examples might be drawn from the Middle Age-
economies, with landlords on one side, and serfs on the other, or - even today - from 
some Latin American or Asian countries run by ruthless authoritarian regimes.  
Hopefully,  such examples should not be with us in the western world.  
 
The features of earning mobility  can be explored on the bases of transition matrices 
gathered by OECD. The OECD data relate to earning mobility of dependent workers 
in the 1985-91 period, with the exclusion of self-employment, the public sector and 
agriculture.  
There are three data sources: household surveys of individual workers (USA, 
Germany); establishment surveys yielding also worker histories (UK); administrative 
data-bases (Italy and France, both from Social Security archives). Administrative 
sources usually cover the whole population (as in France) or very large random  
samples (as in Italy, where the sampling ratio is 1:90).   
I have used the full (6 x 6) matrices - the states being the five income brackets around 
the median + one state corresponding to "part-time work".
4 Comments will be 
confined to the earnings mobility of full-time wage and salary workers only, as this is 
the only easy  way to insure comparability.  
If the lifetime earning profile of a dependent worker were completely predetermined, 
she/he would be trapped in the same relative position of the wage distribution where 
he/she began his/her career.  As a consequence, all transition probabilities P(s,s), for 
                                                 
4 Here and in what follows I will refer to transitions across earning bands around the median, as defined by the 
OECD. There is a strong methodological drawback in making use of transitions across percentiles (deciles). It can 
be proved (Revelli, 1997) that, under rather general conditions on the underlying model of individual wage 
growth, the transition probabilities across percentiles of the earning distribution are independent from the variance 
of the process. This annihilates almost all of the expected differences among countries, thus making comparisons 
quite difficult. 
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any state  s = 1,2 ... S, would be equal to 1, even if individuals differed at the 
beginning of their career. Likewise any immobility indicator would be equal to 1. 
If  segmentation is a relevant issue, then it becomes important to distinguish what 
happens at both ends of the earnings distribution.  Persistence in the low tail of the 
distribution may or may not go hand-in-hand with persistence in the upper tail.  
Looking at overall immobility ratios may be very misleading , as it averages out 
differences where they should instead emerge
5. 
A simple method to pursue this line consists in contrasting two immobility indicators, 
one computed in a partition of North-West cells of the transition matrix (denoting 
persistence in low earnings), the other in a partition of South-East cells (denoting 
persistence in high earnings).  I have chosen to contrast the probability  P(1,1) of 
persisting in the first earning band (less than 0.65 * median) in the five-year  
period 1986-91
6, with a standard immobility index (IM2) calculated from the 
diagonal in the remaining (4 x 4) matrix. 
IM2  is defined as:    IM2 = [P(2,2) + P(3,3) + P(4,4) + P(5,5)] / 4. 
The following results are obtained
7  (F1 – in the third column of Table 1 - stands for 




                                                 
5 The standard immobility ratio calculated from OECD 1986-91 data yield the following results: 
 France   0.72   UK   0.63 
 Germany 0.70   USA   0.64 
 Danmark 0.62   Italy   0.66 
which look all but particularly evokative.   For instance, Denmark and  USA look almost identical, while 
- as will be clear in what follows - they are very different. 
 
6  An additional problem, in connection with the measurement of persistence in low pay,  is  how to 
treat people who have no wage.  There is  quite a high turnover from one year to the next between 
those at the bottom of the wage distribution and the unemployed (the low-pay no-pay cycle).   The 
measures of P(1,1) – persistence in low pay -   utilized in this paper,  refer to individuals who are at 
work both in 1986 and in 1991, regardless of their position in between. Those who have become 
unemployed sometime after 1986 and are still unemployed in 1991 are not accounted for.  I have 
chosen to leave them out  altogether (to improve cross-country comparability), although, in a few 
cases, the information could have been retrieved.  My choice is justified  by the fact that  here I deal 
with  persistence in low pay, and not persistence in low income.  
 
7 A distance (Euclidean metric) between the transition matrices may also be computed. This too hides the contrast 
found between mobility and labor market segmentation. It yields the following matrix of distances, which 
confirms the ranking with the USA and Germany/Italy at the opposite extremes: 
 
 USA  FR  IT  UK  GER 
USA  0  0.023 0.026 0.013 0.024 
FR   0  0.008  0.013  0.006 
IT     0  0.015  0.007 
UK     0  0.014 
GER      0 
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Table 1 Indicators of  immobility and segmentation 
 All  workers  male  Female 
  P(1,1) IM2  F1  P(1,1) IM2  F1  P(1,1) IM2  F1 
USA  55.8 42.5 27.5 45.4 41.3 16.7 62.5 43.0 42.2 
FR  31.6 62.9 11.0 22.7 62.2   7.9  39.7 63.3 39.8 
IT  21.8 60.8 10.0 15.7 60.5   6.9  27.9 59.2 16.1 
UK  39.0 50.2 17.7 29.2 49.6   9.5  45.6 52.7 34.6 
GER  26.0 61.3 18.7 15.4 61.4 10.7 33.7 58.6 35.9 
DNK  8.1 56.8  6.0 6.5 55.9  3.6 9.0 52.8  9.6 
FIN 36.9 47.9 14.3 42.1 47.3 10.7 33.5 42.9 18.3 
SWE  15.4 65.5 4.2  9.1  63.0 2.6  20.0 70.0 7.7 
 
One contrast is immediately clear: while P(1,1) is much higher for the USA than for 
the European countries, IM2 is instead lower. 
Gross as IM2 may be, it unequivocally points at the fact that upward and downward 
mobility is higher in the USA for all, except for the least fortunate earners. For the 
latter, instead, the chance of improving their relative position is very slim in the USA, 
and somewhat better in Europe. The contrast between   P(1,1) and  IM2  strongly 
suggests the existence of labour market segmentation. 
The extent of segmentation in the USA is shown also by the fraction of low-paid 
workers in the 1986-wage distribution (F1): 27.5% of the USA full-time dependent 
workers earn less than 0.65*median, six times the corresponding fraction of Sweden 
and Denmark, two-and-a-half times that of France and Italy, one-and-a-half times that 
of Germany and the U.K.  The figure for Germany may look surprisingly high, but it 
is not: German youth – at least until reunification - entered employment at the end of 
the dual education and training system at low entry pay, but destined to catch up in 
few years. Interestingly,  F1 of female workers is comparable, except for Italy: here 
the difference is due to the scarce diffusion of part-time work, and, consequently, the 
lower female partecipation.  
These results are not  independent from the dispersion of the earnings distributions, 
which differs widely from country to country. Take, for example, the Swedish record 
of enormous compression of relative wages under centralized “solidarity” bargaining 
(broken down only in the mid Nineties): in the Eighties the Swedish hourly wage 
distribution was so dense that a relative wage increase of 30% was enough to carry a 
worker from the lowest decile of the blue-collar distribution all the way to the 
highest. A parallel move in the U.K. would have required a relative increase of more 
than 200%, and for a US manufacturing employee over 400%.
8 
                                                 
8 D.A.Hibbs and H. Locking,  JOLE, Oct. 2000, 
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2.2  A closer inspection by age-group 
 
Table 1 may raise doubts on the grounds that the earnings transition matrices for all 
age groups pooled together, as those utilized above, may hide composition effects: 
transition probabilities of young workers differ substantially from those of adult and 
aged people. Unless the age distribution of the sample populations is pretty much the 
same in all countries under observation, the indications of table 1 could be distorted.  
As tab. 2  shows, the age distributions are indeed quite different. Two distributions 
are displayed here: that of full-time wage and salary workers (FTW), and that of the 
whole OECD samples (ALL). The two may differ if the original sample is one of 
workers only (as in Italy,  France and UK) or if it is representative of a population 
less restrictively defined (as in USA and Germany). 
 
Table 2 
Age  distribution  (1986)  of full-time wage and salary workers (FTW) and of the complete sample 
populations  (ALL) 
 
 USA   ITA  FRA  U.K.    GER   
age 
groups  FTW  ALL FWT ALL FWT ALL FWT  ALL  FWT  ALL 
<  25  10  11 23 30 17 29 22  24  22  20 
25-34  30  26 29 27 33 29 24  24  25  21 
35-49  40  37 36 31 33 29 33  34  34  32 
50-64  20  26 12 12 17 13 21  18  19  27 
  100  100 100 100 100 100 100  100  100  100 
 
I have, therefore, gone back to the transition matrices for four different age groups, 
and recomputed the equivalent of table 1 as follows: 
 
Table 3 
age       15-24           25-34           35-49             50-64               // 
 P 
(1,1) 
IM2 F2    P 
(1,1) 
IM2 F2    P 
(1,1) 
IM2 F2    P 
(1,1) 
IM2 F2   F2 
all 
usa  47.9  27.0  27.2   40.4  42.9 17.7   61.6  42.7  13.2   59.9  36.0  6.8   15.4 
fra  18.0  34.2  8.0   26.4  53.7  6.0   27.5  61.6  3.9   30.3  57.3  5.3   5.9 
ita  13.1  39.2  13.2   21.4  55.4  6.1   32.7  63.3  5.0   44.7  62.7  6.0   7.9 
uk  23.6  35.8  21.3   35.6  44.8  5.8   47.6  52.9  12.8   55.4  49.4  8.0   9.8 
ger  16.7  31.8  27.7   16.7  54.1  5.6   41.5  63.8  3.2   73.7  19.3  2.6   8.3 
fin      19.1      10.4       8.0       6.4   11.4 
dk      11.2       3.1       1.2       0.8   3.6 
 
The wage distributions 1986 and 1991 from which I derive table 3 are the original 
distributions for all age groups together, and not the distributions specific of each age 
group. If such were not the case, little  could be said to either strengthen or weaken 
our previous conclusions.  Age-specific transition matrices would not reveal that 
persistence in low pay, described by  P(1,1), is increasing in age in all the European 
countries (less so in the USA),  an indication that mobility, higher at young age,  
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decreases as life goes on.  The new indications are very similar to those seen already.  
As before,  and in all but the oldest age group,  P(1,1) - stickiness in low pay - is 
much higher in the USA than in the European countries, while IM2 - the complement 
of which  (1 - IM2) denotes mobility outside the low-pay end of the earnings 
distribution - is instead lower.  Among the European countries, the U.K. looks, here 
again, the closest to  North America.  Evidence of labor market segmentation in the 
USA, compared to continental Europe, is strongly confirmed.     
In the 50-64 age group Germany is the exception: persistence is higher at the bottom 
of the distribution, while there is a lot  more mobility in the remaining portion.  In 
Germany, however,  F2, the 1986-share of people in low pay, is only 3.2 at age 35-
49, and 2.6 at  age 50-64, much lower than in the remaining countries.  I shall return 
to the case of Germany in the next paragraph.  
 
 
3.  LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
PERFORMANCE 
 
In order to investigate the relation between labor market segmentation and the 
macroeconomy, it is useful to have a scalar indicator of LMS. 
I propose here two very simple, alternative, indicators: 
(1)  s1 =  P(1,1) – IM2 
(2)  s2 =  P(1,1) / IM2 
 
where  P(1,1)  is the probability of persistence in the low tail of the earnings 
distribution, however defined, and  IM2  an immobility indicator in the upper tail (the 
rest) of  the distribution, hence itself an average of persistence probabilities. Both  
P(1,1) and IM2 are bounded between 0 and 1.   
Let us then see how  s1 and s2  behave in different scenarios.  There are  two polar 
cases of no-segmentation, never even approached by the countries under observation: 
 
1  Perfect immobility in the  whole earnings distribution  (IMM): the transition 
matrix is equal to the identity matrix.   Both P(1,1)  and  IM2  = 1;   s1 = 0 ;  s2 = 1; 
 
2  Perfect mobility (MOB):  all the elements of the transition matrix are 
identical, and equal to  1/n   (where n is the number of states).  Here too   s1 = 0 ;  s2 
= 1. 
 
Next, we have two scenarios, denoting polar and opposite  configurations of the labor 
market, only one being a stable configuration:  
 
3  LMS,  characterized by perfect immobility in the low tail of the distribution 
and perfect mobility in the rest of the distribution: thus,  P(1,1) = 1 and IM2 =  0.    
Here   s1 =  1  and   s2  Æ  oo    
  8 
 
4  UNST,  represents a theoretical opposite extreme: perfect mobility in the low 
tail, i.e. zero persistence in low-pay  -  P(1,1) = 0 - and perfect immobility in the rest 
of the earnings distribution, i.e.  IM2 = 1.   In fact, this configuration is unstable, as it 
collapses in one transition into a version of IMM, differing from the previous one in 
that the support of the distribution is shifted to the right: anyone in the low tail of the 
distribution immediately reaches any other state above the low-tail threshold (not 
necessarily with equal probability).   Here     s1 =  - 1    and    s2  =  0.  
 
Thus  s1  varies between  -1  and +1,  while s2  varies  between  0  and  oo,   both 
increasing with the extent of labor market segmentation [LMS]. 
 
Both  s1  and  s2  fail to distinguish  whenever  P(1,1) = IM2, for instance the two 
polar cases of IMM  and MOB, where  P(1,1) and IM2  are equal to each other and 
take value 1  and  0  respectively.   More generally,  s1  takes the same value for 
different pairs [P(1,1), IM2]  along  iso-lines parallel  to the main diagonal of  fig. X.  
Instead  s2  takes the same value for pairs  [P(1,1), IM2] along rays originating in  
(0,0), as in fig. Y.
9    This may not be too a serious drawback for the purpose of 
preliminary investigation:  none of the polar cases are ever approached  in our sample 
countries,  with  P(1,1) and IM2  always distant from their extreme values 0 and 1.   
 
   
 
                                                 
9  s1 and  s2   yield different rankings of LMS,  as shown below.  The properties of each of the two 
indicators will have to be investigated in more detail at a later stage figure  Z. 
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Case studies on  low-pay persistence
10  indicate that  P(1,1) is quite stable in the 
business cycle; so is any immobility indicator, and hence also  IM2.  Aside from 
measurement error,  s1  and  s2  should, therefore, be  stable indicators of  LM- 
segmentation.  In what follows I contrast the extent of  labor market segmentation 
(measured by either  s1  or  s2) with a stable catch-all indicator of labor market 
performance, the employment to population ratio  (E/POP).   
 
 
                                                 
10 See:  W. Salverda, S. Bazen and M. Gregory, The European-American Employment Gap, Wage 
Inequality, Earnings Mobility and Skill,  LOWER Report, June 2001, and also previous LOWER 
(European Low-Wage Employment Research Network) publications.  
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Figura 
 
A quick look  - on a cross-sectional sample of eight countries - suggests  a U-shaped  
relation,  with E/POP high in correspondence with high and low levels of LMS, and  
low  in correspondence of intermediate LMS.  The same configuration emerges if  s2  
is  used  instead of  s1. 
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 P(1,1)  IM2  s1  s2  E/POP  ELMP/GDP 
USA  55.8 42.5  0.133 1.31  72.2  0.5 
FRANCE  31.6 62.9  -  0.313 0.50  59.9  3.2 
ITALY  21.8 60.8  -  0.390 0.36  53.9  2.5 
U.K.  39.0 50.2  -  0.112 0.78  72.4  2.6 
GERMANY  26.0 61.3  -  0.353 0.42  64.1  3.8 
DENMARK  8.1 56.8  -  0.487 0.14  75.4  6.6 
FINLAND  36.9 47.9  -  0.110 0.77  74.1  5.6 
SWEDEN  15.4 65.5  -  0.501 0.23  83.1  5.5 
 
 
The suggestion that E/POP and  LMS may be simultaneously determined in a stylised 
model is strong.   A preliminary explanation  (that may lead, in a later stage, to the 
construction of such a model)  requires to identify an  exogenous variable that shapes 
both the labor supply of the “weak” segments of the labor force (“weak” being the  
young unskilled, the old, and eventually the women in countries of Southern Europe),  
as well as the extent of labor market segmentation.  There is a natural candidate for 
this, and it is the extent (quantity and quality-wise) of the welfare institutions.  
 
For simplicity, consider three different sets of countries: group A, typified by the 
Scandinavian area, where the welfare state has a long tradition of efficiency and 
generosity for all citizens; group B, exemplified by countries of Southern and 
continental Europe, where the welfare system is less generous and more selective in 
its target groups (here it is not important to identify which groups may benefit more 
than others).  The third group, C, includes countries where the welfare state is 
historically weak (as in USA) or where it has lost much of its pervasive nature (UK).  
 
In each group the extent of labor market segmentation is inversely proportional to the 
generosity of the welfare system. This is self-explanatory and does not need much 
justification. Where the safety network provided by the institutions is weak, poverty 
persistence arises as a most serious problem.  Mobility may be high in the upper tail 
of the earnings distribution, but fails to reach the extreme fringes of the labour 
market. 
The relation between welfare and labour supply  requires, instead, some elaboration.  
I assume that prime-age work-force is all at work at some equilibrium wage 
(partecipation rates among prime-age men are equally high in all countries:  HERE 
THE DATA ! ).  The labour supply of the “secondary” component of the work-force  
takes the following form: 
 
            0                        for   w < wr(W) 
Ls =   
a +  b(W)          for   w >  wr(W) 
 
where    wr’(W)  > 0;     b’(W) < 0.  
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The reservation wage  (wr)  of the secondary segment of population, below which 
labour supply is zero, is a function of the generosity and pervasiveness of the welfare 
state [W]  ( wr  is  often set equal to the unemployment benefits):  highest in group A, 
and lowest in group C.   In addition, and reinforcing the previous argument,  the 
degree of wage inequality in the three groups of countries impacts on the difference 
between the reservation wage  (wr)  and the equilibrium wage of the primary 
segment:  the difference will be relatively small in group A,  somewhat larger in 
group  B, and very substantial in group C.  The wider the group fully protected by W,  
the larger the number of potential workers willing to take a job at a wage immediately 
above  wr.  The slope  b(W)  is, instead,  a decreasing function of  W,  i.e. it depends 
on the amount of need:  in all three groups of countries the wage level attained in the 
secondary segment is at least as high as the reservation wage .  We observe, in fact,  
that the number of people at work in the non-prime-age segment of the population is 
very high in countries of groups A and C, and relatively lower in countries of group 
B. 






Thus, in group A countries with robust welfare institutions, high expenditure in 
ALMP and low wage inequality  – typified by  Scandinavia -  LMS  is at its lowest 
and E/POP at its highest:  services are provided by the State to working mothers with 
children, youth and potentially active aged people, in the form of nursery schools,  
youth housing, generous support to school-to-work transitions and retraining 
programs at all ages, active labor market instruments aimed at putting the 
unemployed back to work.   
In group B countries - much of continental and Southern Europe - the welfare 
institutions are not as rooted in the tradition, and their generosity does not match that 
of the  Scandinavian countries.  With wage inequality being higher, some LMS (as 
defined here) appears,  and E/POP  is lower as some potential workers (women and 
aged people) cannot “afford” to be at work.
11  
Finally, there are countries – group C,  of which the USA is the obvious example - 
with high income inequality, highly deregulated labor markets, and low employment 
protection.  Here poverty persistence is a more serious problem. Mobility is high in 
the upper tail of the earnings distribution, but fails to reach the extreme fringes of the 
labor market.  The impact of ALMP  is of shorter duration; seldom do they yield the 
desired  long-run effects for which they have often been enacted.  Structural reforms 
with strong and long-lasting redistributional effects are costly and basically out of 
                                                 
11   Studies of the LOWER network  (1999 and 2000)  document  that poverty persistence is quite 
common in Europe, and touches fringes of the  population that have surprisingly similar characteristics 
(examples----).    
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reach. In fact, they may be  inefficient instruments also from a “political economy” 
point of view:  reforms are aimed at population segments that “pay” in political terms, 
i.e. that will vote in favour of the party that supports the reforms. The degree of 
political partecipation of the marginal fringes of the LM  is often low and unreliable.  
Political absenteeism is widespread.   As a consequence,  polarization takes hold, and 
segmentation becomes a natural outcome.  In such countries almost everyone is 
forced to be at  work, including aged people who cannot live on public pensions: 
many  hold “bad” jobs that carry low pay, no benefits, high risk of sudden 
termination.  Thus E/POP is high, because the safety networks are insufficient, 
segmentation creeps in, with the less endowed unable to escape the vicious  low-pay 





In this paper I propose a very simple framework for the analysis of labor market 
segmentation.  The main conclusion is deceptively simple: where the employment 
rate is high, the extent of labor market segmentation depends on the generosity and 
efficiency of the welfare state. It is destined to be high if the safety networks are 
insufficient.  In countries with less pervasive welfare institutions, the employment 
rate will not attain such high levels as in countries where the same institutions are 
either much weaker, or much stronger.   
 
Much more work, both empirical and theoretical, remains to be done in order to 
have a neat picture of how employment and segmentation interact.   I  briefly 
mention, to conclude, some of the problems that will have to be addressed in the next 
future. 
 
1  There might  be a subtle problem in some EU - countries, especially of 
Southern Europe: here labour market segmentation may hide in the black economy, 
which develops for many reasons:  as a reaction to tight regulation and high taxation, 
but also as a consequence of  a fragile industrialization: small, local producers of 
traditional, highly labor-intensive consumer goods find it easier to fight the 
competition of developing countries by cutting labor-related costs  (including the 
elusion of safety regulations, and using child labor), rather than innovating and 
upgrading the quality of their products.  Thus in the black economies of countries like 
Italy, Spain, Greece (and others too), there exist many jobs that official statistics fail 
to catch altogether 
12. A vast majority of them are "bad" jobs, with no perspectives of 
                                                 
12   One well known problem with Italy’s Labour Force Survey  is that black workers seldom reveal 
their status for fear of being identified.  Is it realistic to suppose that  Spanish and Greek black workers 
should behave very differently ? The main reason for the problem of incorrect reporting being more 
serious in Italy and Spain than, for instance, in USA and UK, has to do with the regulatory regime: 
here all jobs are legal  (safe the ones linked to outright criminal activities),  many low-paid jobs are  
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upwards mobility.  If they entered the employment count, we would see a higher  E/P, 
and, I would guess,  a degree of labor market segmentation.   This amounts to say that 
the distance between the labor markets of  Southern Europe and that of the USA  
could be smaller than  official statistics lead us to believe. 
 
2  The increasing degree of labour market flexibility and deregulation in Europe 
pose additional problems per se.  To the extent that it may be difficult to observe 
earnings and tenure related to many of the new flexible jobs, the measurement of 
earnings mobility may be distorted.  A vast share of new hirings takes the form of 
fixed time or temporary contracts, part-time positions, disguised forms of self-
employment, work leasing, atypical contracts of various sorts, all aimed at reducing 
labour costs and making work flexible.   Do the data at hand catch all these new 
forms ?  In some countries they probably do, but in some they certainly don’t.  Italy is 
one example, but certainly not the only one. In much of Italy there still is a cultural 
bias  in favor of the “job for life”: it may well happen that atypical, temporary jobs 
are not regarded as true working positions, and self-reporting at work in LFS-type 
surveys may be seriously downward biased.    In addition, where the data originate 
from administrative sources some atypical forms of work may not be officially 
reported. This being the case, the measurement of earnings mobility is distorted, with 
all likelihood in the direction of underestimating persistence in low pay and 
overestimating upwards mobility. 
 
In addition, there are reasons to believe that the extent of labor market segmentation 
may be increasing: 
 
3  policies aiming at helping entry of youth into employment.   Payroll tax 
rebates,  lower  firing costs (both  come together with fixed duration  - one or two-
year -  contracts)  increase the dualistic features of the labor market as firms find it 
advantageous to change the  mix of skilled / unskilled workforce in favor of the latter 
[cfr. Blanchard-Landier (2000); Boeri (1999); Contini et al. (1998)].  Worker 
turnover  increases in parallel, and the incentives (by firms and workers)  to invest in 
human capital will be reduced.  Thus, while the  “good & lucky” workers may have 
better chances to enhance their human capital, the “bad” ones will not.  As a result, 
dualism - which could be, in principle, a transitory stage for the new entrants in the 
labor market - will consolidate into persistent segmentation.  
 
4  the increasing pace of outsourcing in many sectors of the economy, and 
particularly in the new economy.  The economic miracle of Silicon Valley may not be 
a typical story, but is illustrative of what may take place in other expansion areas, in 
the USA and elsewhere.   Silicon Valley has probably created more wealth in a 
shorter time period than virtually any other place in history. But, at the same time, 
                                                                                                                                           
exempted from social security contributions. This effectively takes out the incentive to disclose one’s 
status to the interviewers.  
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average wages for low-end workers are 10% lower than a decade ago, while living 
costs are 40% higher than in the rest of the US and housing prices have gone up by 
65% since 1995.  The key reason lies in the high tech's heavy reliance on outsourcing 
and subcontracting, a model that helps higher skilled workers thrive, able as they are 
to hop from one employer to another, jacking up their pay in every move. But for the 
less skilled, outsourcing only serves to hold wages down.  This gives high-tech firms 
maximum flexibility in a fast-moving industry. It also creates a highly contingent 
workforce: part-timers, temporary job holders, contract (as well as illegal piece-wise) 
workers, and the self-employed have jumped from 19% of Santa Clara's workforce in 
the Eighties to 42% today  (by contrast, the share of contingent workers in the US as 
a whole has climbed from 27% to 33% in the same period).  Because the skill gap in 
high-tech is so vast, the less-skilled employees are likely to benefit less from the 
upward mobility that allows many low-skilled workers to achieve middle-class status. 